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It is often believed that the type of religion that a group of people follow (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, etc.) can account for significant and important cultural differences, with implications for business ethics, corporate and social responsibility, and other business-related variables. The alternative view is that the cultural differences between religions are either trivial or are actually misinterpreted ethnic or national differences. The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate these two views.

The authors focus on Africa, the most religious region of the world, whose cultures should therefore be especially susceptible to the effect of religion. We used latest data from 100 religious groups, following 19 religions, and living in 27 countries, from the nationally representative Afrobarometer. The items in the authors’ analysis reveal cultural ideologies concerning key cultural domains, such as inclusive–exclusive society (gender equality, homophobia and xenophobia), the role of government and the role of religion in politics. These domains are related to cultural conservatism versus modernization and have clear implications for management. The authors compare the group-level effect of belonging to a certain nation to the effect of belonging to a certain religion.

A hierarchical cluster analysis produced crystal-clear national clusters, with only one of the 100 religious groups systematically clustering outside its respective national cluster. The authors did not obtain a single cross-national cluster of coreligionists. Variation between nations was far greater than between religious groups and the latter was most often statistically insignificant. A comparison of Muslims with other religions revealed that Muslims are not generally more conservative, although they do have a marginally greater tendency to be less gender egalitarian. The authors conclude that the African national environments have a much stronger impact on cultural differences than do religions. The effect of the latter, compared to the former, is negligibly small and often insignificant. Thus, they find no evidence that religions can produce a powerful discriminant effect on some of the most important elements of culture.

Non-Abrahamic religions are poorly represented in Africa. Therefore, we could not assess their effect on culture. Nevertheless, it seems that attempts to explain cultural differences in values and ideologies in terms of religious differences are misguided, even in a cultural environment where religion is very strong.

The findings could help improve executive training in cross-cultural awareness, purging it from erroneous views on the origins of cultural differences. Managers should avoid simplistic explanations of the values and ideologies of their employees in terms of their religious affiliation.

Simplistic (yet very popular) explanations of culture as a function of type of religion should be avoided in society at large, too. The idea that different religions generate different cultures is not only dubious from a scientific perspective but also socially dangerous as it may lead to religious intolerance.

This is only the second study in the history of the whole cross-cultural field that provides a multinational and multidenominational comparison of the effect of nations versus religious denominations on culture.

1. Religions are often portrayed as sources of important cultural differences.

2. We compared differences in cultural modernization between religions and between nations in Africa.

3. Variation between 27 African countries dwarfed that between 100 religious groups.

4. Practically all religious groups yielded perfectly homogeneous national clusters.

5. We did not observe a single cluster of coreligionists from different countries.

6. We conclude that nations have a strong effect on cultural differences whereas religions have a minimal effect at best.

Religions are often portrayed as sources of important cultural differences.

We compared differences in cultural modernization between religions and between nations in Africa.

Variation between 27 African countries dwarfed that between 100 religious groups.

Practically all religious groups yielded perfectly homogeneous national clusters.

We did not observe a single cluster of coreligionists from different countries.

We conclude that nations have a strong effect on cultural differences whereas religions have a minimal effect at best.

Recent studies exposed serious issues with Hofstede's popular model of culture, especially his uncertainty avoidance (UA) and masculinity-femininity (MAS–FEM) dimensions. However those studies did not focus on work-related issues as in Hofstede’s research.

We followed Hofstede’s approach to his dimensions more closely than anyone before in a large cross-cultural study. We used data from the nationally representative International Social Survey Program (over 50,000 respondents from 47 countries), measuring work goals and work-related stress in a way similar to Hofstede's.

UA and MAS–FEM, as measured and described by Hofstede, did not replicate. They lack internal consistency and the items that target them are not associated with Hofstede's UA and MAS–FEM indices. Instead, some of those items follow a very different and sound logic, invalidating Hofstede's UA and MAS–FEM theories. Our study provides additional evidence that UA and MAS–FEM are misleading artifacts of Hofstede's IBM database, with no analogues outside IBM. An improved, recently reported version of individualism-collectivism (IDV-COLL) replicated nearly perfectly, solidifying the validity of that dimension of national culture. A revised version of long-term orientation, called flexibility–monumentalism (FLX–MON) also replicated well.

We discuss lessons for the cross-cultural field, including cross-cultural management, as well as policy-making by national governments, to be drawn from the controversial story of Hofstede's model. We advise a stronger focus on empirical confirmation and replication rather than excessive faith in fascinating, yet unproven theory.

To avoid further confusion, we advise researchers, consultants and managers to reconsider the use of Hofstede's UA and MAS–FEM and focus on the valid dimensions in the revised Minkov-Hofstede model.

A number of national governments recently launched large-scale studies of their national cultures, based on Hofstede's model. The goal of those studies was to involve culture in the design of social and economic development policies. Studies of this kind should be founded on empirically sound models or else they can result in the formulation of flawed policies.

This is the first study of large samples from many nations showing that even when Hofstede's method is followed closely by focusing on work-related issues, UA and MAS–FEM do not emerge from the data, and this is not because of data deficiencies but because the logic of UA and MAS–FEM is demonstrably flawed. Our study also demonstrates new methods for the replication of IDV-COLL and FLX–MON, though without claiming that they are superior to existing ones.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible relationship of religion and culture with the social capital in a particular region.

The data of 85 regions from 26 European countries are analysed. Regression analysis is used for analysing cultural dimensions, religion-related aspects and the communist past as possible factors of social capital components. In addition, graphic analysis is used for the generalisation of the results.

The results from both the regression and graphic analyses indicate that cultural dimensions capture the possible reasons for different levels of social capital better than religion-related aspects or the division according to the communist background.

Conclusions can be drawn only for the European regions analysed. Data were not available for regions in all European countries and including control variables was limited by the data availability.

When intending to develop policies for increasing social capital, the culture of a particular region should be assessed in order to predict the success of the policies.

The novelty of this study lies in including cultural dimensions based on Hofstede’s concept to the set of possible factors determining the level of social capital in a region.

Purpose — The purpose of this chapter is to assess empirically the levels of trust across the world and to explore possible differences in the levels of trust among different groups of respondents.Design/methodology/approach — We analyze the individual-level data from 81 countries around the world using latest available European Values Study (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) datasets (most data refer to the year 2008). Methodologically, we compose three trust indicators using confirmatory factor analysis and then compare the level of trust in different groups. After that we calculate country-level means of trust indicators and use these as inputs in cluster analysis.Findings — The results of our empirical analysis show that the level of trust among supervisors do not differ significantly from the overall level of trust in a society, supporting the hypothesis that honesty and trust tend to be contagious. Still, there are statistically significant differences in trust levels between almost all explored population groups which were composed on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical literature.Limitations — Our analysis covered only selected socio-economic determinants of trust. It would be reasonable to add some contextual or systemic factors at the level of nation (like GDP per capita, quality of formal institutions, society’s polarization, or others) into further analysis.Originality/value — Our analysis distinguishes between three different types of trust which are studied both at individual and national level. Also, differences between age groups and educational groups, men and women, religious and non-religious persons are examined. Finally, we compare the levels of trust of those supervising someone with the average trust levels in the society as a whole.

The economic life is often hindered by problems that can be successfully solved by tapping into concepts of social sciences. Herein, basic assumptions uniform people’s behavior but these may also create problems and thus, nowadays the economy meets the consequences of the so-called “soft issues” for various reasons. In this light, the aim of the volume is to show what kind of influences may turn out from honesty and dishonesty to management and the economy, in general. These effects generate an ensemble where factors could affect and be affected by each other in several ways.

Isaac O. Amoako is a researcher at the Centre for Enterprise and Economic Development Research (CEEDR) and lecturer in enterprise and small business at the Department of International Management and Innovation, all at Middlesex University Business School, UK. He completed his Ph.D. in 2012 in the same university and his paper on “alternative institutions” used by exporting SMEs in Ghana has been accepted and forthcoming in International Small Business Journal (ISBJ). His research interests include enterprise and small business start-up and management, interorganizational trust, culture and organizations, and international business management. Prior to his academic career he was an entrepreneur starting and managing his own businesses for over 20 years.