Search results

The purpose of this study is to examine the connection between board composition and value relevance of financial information in Ghana.

The study uses a panel data of 144 firm-year observations of listed firms in Ghana.

The study finds that a higher fraction of independent directors is associated with lower firm value. The study further finds that board size is positively related to firm value, whereas duality is negatively associated with firm value.

The practical implication of this paper is that investors and regulators should be mindful that specifying governance composition should not only be based on “so-called” codes of best practices but also the level of the country's or the sector's development and local institutional structures.

This study uses five different measurements of market share and considers the impact of the provision of the Code of Best Practices in Ghana.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between board attributes and firm value to identify board attributes that are “pleasant” to have from what is required to have in financial and non-financial firms.

The paper uses five measures of firm value to estimate the relationship between internal governance mechanism for financial and non-financial firms using system generalized methods of moments.

The paper finds that board independence and board size is a “must” have and value-enhancing board attributes for financial firms. On the contrary, board independence may be considered as a “pleasant” board attribute for non-financial firms. Further, the paper finds that duality is not value-enhancing board attribute for both financial and non-financial firms.

The findings imply that differences in requirements for strategic or resource and monitoring functions in financial and non-financial firms are responsible for the differences in board attributes that are value-relevant for these firms.

The findings suggest that the value relevance of board attributes differs in financial and non-financial firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether board characteristics moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and bank risk-taking of universal banks in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The paper uses 700 bank-year observations of universal banks in SSA between 2009 and 2019. The paper further uses the two-step generalized method of moments as the baseline estimator.

The paper finds that capital adequacy regulation is positively related to overall bank and liquidity risks. Nonetheless, capital adequacy regulation increases credit risk in the sampled banks. The paper further reports that board characteristics individually and significantly moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and risk-taking.

The findings have implications for regulators of universal banks that board characteristics matter for capital adequacy regulation to impact risk-taking behavior.

The paper extends the existing literature on the effect of board characteristics on the capital adequacy regulations and risk-taking behavior nexus of universal banks.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of board experience and independence on mitigating agency conflict between shareholders and managers.

This paper uses a panel data of 137 firms listed on stock exchanges in Ghana and Nigeria over a period of seven years. System generalized method of moments and other estimation techniques were adopted for the study. Using agency and resource dependence theories, board experience and independence ignored in previous studies are selected for the study.

The findings of this paper indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship between board experience, board independence, and agency conflict. A further examination using an agency score computed from the principal factor analysis of the four main agency proxies indicates a significant and negative relationship between board independence and agency conflict, but a negative and statistically non-significant relation between board experience and agency conflict.

The authors’ evidence has important implications for countries that are currently or contemplating pursuing board reforms to recommend the appointment of more independent and experience directors to corporate board.

This paper introduces a new proxy for assessing human and social capital of directors to test the integration hypothesis of a unique data set from Ghana and Nigeria toward mitigating agency conflict.