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This study develops a model and algorithm to solve the decentralized resource-constrained multi-project scheduling problem (DRCMPSP) and provides a suitable priority rule (PR) for coordinating global resource conflicts among multiple projects.

This study addresses the DRCMPSP, which respects the information privacy requirements of project agents; that is, there is no single manager centrally in charge of generating multi-project scheduling. Accordingly, a three-stage model was proposed for the decentralized management of multiple projects. To solve this model, a three-stage solution approach with a repeated negotiation mechanism was proposed.

The experimental results obtained using the Multi-Project Scheduling Problem LIBrary confirm that our approach outperforms existing methods, regardless of the average utilization factor (AUF). Comparative analysis revealed that delaying activities in the lower project makespan produces a lower average project delay. Furthermore, the new PR LMS performed better in problem subsets with AUF < 1 and large-scale subsets with AUF > 1.

A solution approach with a repeated-negotiation mechanism suitable for the DRCMPSP and a new PR for coordinating global resource allocation are proposed.

The replenishment of construction materials heavily relies on the functioning of heavy machinery, which often leads to confusion and negotiations among construction work groups regarding the allocation rights of these materials. When multiple groups require the same construction materials, they often struggle to determine whether the delivered materials are intended for their own use or if they have encroached upon supplies designated for others. Such uncertainties and negotiations frequently result in delays in construction progress and have the potential to escalate into conflicts. To minimize misunderstandings among work groups and mitigate the risk of severe safety consequences, it is crucial to understand the decision-making processes involved in the interaction between work groups.

This paper adopts a game theory approach to examine the interactions among work groups from a safety perspective. Quantum response equilibrium (QRE), as a specialized form of game with incomplete information, is assumed to govern the behavior of work groups in this study. By conducting a questionnaire survey, interactive scenarios were simulated. A resource overlap scenario for high-altitude construction is established, with the key factors being the importance of construction materials, the time required to supplement materials, whether managers are present and the climate within the groups. The model parameters were estimated using the expectation–maximization algorithm. Additionally, individual traits and safety awareness are surveyed in the questionnaire, further explaining the results of the game.

The findings indicate that the likelihood of conflicts between work groups under resource overlap can be quantified. The radical behavior of construction work groups exhibits a positive correlation with the importance of construction materials and the time required for material replenishment. Furthermore, the presence of a safety climate and the oversight of management personnel play a significant role in maintaining the composure of construction work groups. The expanded results of the questionnaire demonstrate that there is considerable room for improvement in workers' safety awareness, and management approaches can be further enhanced to prevent unsafe behaviors from occurring.

A novel game theory model was developed to evaluate the behavior of construction groups in situations of resource overlap. This model offers practical suggestions to improve safety performance and efficiency in construction projects.