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The purpose of this article is to explore Maggie Kuhn's theoretical and analytical contributions to social gerontology and more broadly to the advancement of critical and public sociology.

This paper is an theoretical exploration of ageing. Maggie Kuhn's and the Gray Panthers theoretical contributions include analyses of, and related to: identity politics, intersectionality, cultural and media studies and the cognitive sciences, the forces and factors in the developing political economy of ageing including critiques of the ageing enterprise and the medical industrial complex, the sociology of knowledge of gerontology and globalization and world imperialism. The concluding section argues that the post‐retirement career of Maggie Kuhn was one of a Public Sociologist.

Maggie Kuhn fulfils the promise of the Project of Public Sociology, which “is to make visible the invisible, to make the private public, to validate these organic connections as part of our sociological life”. Maggie Kuhn's example moved forward the work of multiple generations of scholars. She lived and produced critical social analyses in pursuit of emancipatory knowledges. Her work is one of the earliest forms, if not the first, of critical pedagogy in gerontology; she promoted and advanced discourses of resistance. Maggie Kuhn was an engaged and outraged, practicing organic intellectual – the epitome of what bell hooks means by “teaching to transgress” and “education as the practice of freedom”. In the 24 years after her involuntary retirement, this was Maggie Kuhn's full‐time transformational agenda.

The paper looks at how the biography of Maggie Kuhn helped to engender the rise of radical social gerontology.

Philosophers and historians of science, along with scientists themselves, have long been interested in the problem of theory succession: “How does one theory supersede another?” Concern with this general topic has led to the development of two major recent theories regarding the issue. These theories of theory succession have emerged principally from reflection on physics. In the eyes of most scientists, this is probably appropriate, since physics seems to offer (at least to most observers) science in its purest form.

In this article, my goal is to approach Thomas S. Kuhn's account of scientific development from the perspective of institutional theory. Reading it this way, his main work can be seen as a treatise on endogenous change of an institutional order, occurring under circumstances that do not allow the expectation of such discontinuities when deploying common institutional arguments. To elucidate the underlying mechanisms, I draw on ideology as the set of beliefs incorporated in the system of orientation Kuhn calls paradigm. From his dense description of paradigm shifts, I deduce five propositions on the role of ideology in radical institutional change. Subsequently, I reconcile these propositions with assumptions of institutional theory and identify, in addition to some convergences, points of divergence, which give impetus to extend conceptions of institutional change.

In this article we shall argue that the Keynesian revolution was a revolution in the sense of Kuhn and that Kuhn's conceptual framework provides a better understanding of the convulsive changes that took place in macro‐economics in the twenties and thirties than alternative growth of knowledge theories that are being discussed in the economics literature at the present time. In the last ten years or so economists have become increasingly interested in the various growth of knowledge theories that have been developed by philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and others. This heightened interest on the part of economists is to be explained by the fact that these new theories are based on the actual behaviour of scientists. The new philosophers of science devote their attention not to “correct scientific method” but to the actual behaviour of scientists. It is because of this revolution in the historiography of science that economists have been able to relate these new theories to their own work and to the development of economic theories in the past.

Integration is policy, practice as well as object of systematic investigation. What we do not know is whether or not integration can be understood as a science. In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn formulated a notion of (natural) sciences based on the emergence of commitments amongst a community of scientists to a set of logics, model and exemplars. He called this a paradigm. The purpose of this paper is to assess the scientific nature of integration by perceiving it as a paradigm in Kuhn’s sense.

The paper proceeds by conceptual reflection through matching existing components, theories and exemplifications of integration to Kuhn’s model of a scientific paradigm. Integration is understood broadly, either vertical or horizontal, and located within the practical domains of policy formulation, policy implementation and evaluation research. The nature, scope and depth of group commitments amongst students and practitioners of integration receive particular attention in line with Kuhn’s social interactionist approach.

Employing Kuhn’s notion of paradigm in the context of integration highlights the fundamental tension between integration efforts and integration outcomes. Whilst integration defines itself in contradistinction to professional boundaries and fragmentation, the paper argues that it fails to develop a strong theoretical and empirical foundation for a robust and stable group commitment. The reason is that the key motivational force that may create a stable group commitment amongst those engaged in integration, the patient perspective, remains outside the integration paradigm. This leaves integration as a practice and policy model underdeveloped, mainly paradigmatically illustrated by singular exemplars and rooted in aspirational policy vocabulary, while clustered around a near dogmatic belief that working together between services must lead to improved quality of care. To become a scientific paradigm the group commitment in integration would have to coalesce around a clear ontology (symbolic generalisations), epistemology (models of knowledge) and manifestations in practice (exemplars).

At present both the ontology and epistemological foundations of integration practice and research are insufficiently clear. This hampers the development of integration practice as well as a better understanding of how to evaluate integration outcomes. Future studies should focus on the depth, nature and subject of group commitments to assess whether integration is a viable candidate for scientific paradigm or an assorted construct of policy aspirations.

The paper questions the rigour and trajectory of integration practice, policy and research. It identifies a tension at the centre of the field between group commitments to scientific exemplars (case studies) and symbolic generalisations, encapsulated in the desire to improve patient care. The notion of a scientific paradigm thus helps to re-frame the discussion about research and practice in integration.

This article attempts to tackle a fundamental methodological question in economics. The task is to investigate whether competing traditions in the history of economics are commensurable or not, that is, whether there is a firm ground on which a researcher could adjudicate the truth content of a theory. Thomas Kuhn in philosophy and Donald McClosky in economics among others are understood to advance the thesis that theories are incommensurable since there is no empirical ground to resort to in order to resolve disputes among traditions in economics. Karl Popper in philosophy and Mark Blaug in economics among others argue that theories are commensurable since there is a sharp and distinct criterion which could determine the scientific content of a theory. A more sophisticated version of Popper's falsificationism has been advanced in philosophy by Imre Lakatos and has been correspondingly followed in economics by Spiro Latsis, E. Roy Weintraub and others.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to explore homicide trends in Trinidad and Tobago, to describe the factors that impact the risk for homicide perpetration and victimization, and to discuss the effectiveness of strategies implemented by law enforcement agencies to prosecute homicide cases.

Design/methodology/approach – The chapter employs a detailed review of relevant literature to explore homicide trends and the strategies instituted to investigate and prosecute this criminal offense.

Findings – Our findings suggest that homicide victimization and perpetration is concentrated among young men of African descent, who reside in underprivileged communities with a high population density. Gang violence prompted by a narco-drug economy, coupled with gun violence, accentuates the risk of homicide perpetration and victimization. As homicide rates remained high, law enforcement officials in Trinidad and Tobago were ill equipped to investigate and make arrests in these offenses.

Originality/value – This chapter adds to the literature on homicide in Trinidad and Tobago by (1) showing that geographic and demographic factors structure homicide victimization and (2) exploring how the political economy of drugs in the Caribbean contributes to murder.

George Herbert Mead is an exemplary figure in sociology, and is central to sociological conceptions of the self and social action. However, other important aspects of Mead's thought have been largely neglected, including his remarkably sophisticated and sociological theory of scientific knowledge. Traditional accounts of the sociology of science identify Thomas Kuhn, and his predecessor, Ludwig Fleck, as pioneers in the social analysis of scientific knowledge, allowing the modern constructionist school of science studies to emerge. This article challenges this history by showing Mead's awareness of the sociological aspects of scientific knowledge in papers that predate both Kuhn and Fleck. Finally, Mead's position attempts to avoid sociological relativism, and offers instead a pragmatist foundation to approach the study of science.