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In 2022, the Baltimore professional development school (PDS) partner schools, John Ruhruh Elementary/Middle School (JREMS) and Notre Dame of Maryland University (NDMU) received funds through a Maryland Educational Emergency Revitalization (MEER) grant to determine (a) to what extent additional resources and professional development would increase JREMS teachers’ efficacy in technology integration and (b) to what extent NDMU professional development in the form of workshops and self-paced computer science modules would result in greater use of technology in the JREMS K-8 classrooms. Results indicated a statistically significant improvement in both teacher comfort with technology and integrated use of technology in instruction.

Survey data were collected on teacher-stated comfort with technology before and after grant implementation. Teachers’ use of technology was also measured by unannounced classroom visits by administration before and after the grant implementation and through artifacts teachers submitted during NDMU professional development modules.

Results showing significant increases in self-efficacy with technology along with teacher integration of technology exemplify the benefits of a PDS partnership.

This initiative was original in its approach to teacher development by replacing required teacher professional development with an invitation to participate and an incentive for participation (a personal MacBook) that met the stated needs of teachers. Teacher motivation was strong because teammates in a strong PDS partnership provided the necessary supports to induce changes in teacher self-efficacy.

Pulchronomics studies the economics of beauty. The purpose of this paper is to research CEO pulchronomics by examining whether a beauty premium exists in CEO compensation and whether this beauty premium is justified by differences in CEO performance.

The authors calculate a facial attractiveness scores (FAS) based on facial symmetry, facial structure and the golden ratio. The authors then perform OLS regressions to examine the effect of CEO beauty on CEO compensation and firm performances.

The authors find that base salaries for attractive CEOs are higher than those for unattractive CEOs, but incentive pays for attractive CEOs are not different from those for unattractive CEOs. The latter is likely due to the fact that attractive CEOs do not outperform unattractive CEOs in operations, innovation, corporate social responsibility and financial reporting quality.

Since the CEO beauty premium is not supported by the superior performance of attractive CEOs, this paper provides new evidence of appearance discrimination in CEO compensation.