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The purpose of this paper is to contrast the historical rise of the managerial function and its reception in law. It thus contributes to the debates on the separation of ownership and control, by showing that managers were never recognized in law. As a result, the managerial function was not protected in law.

This paper brings together management history and the history of UK company law to study the emergence of management in the early twentieth century and the law’s response. The authors bring new historical evidence to bear on the company law reforms of the second half of the twentieth century and, in particular, on the changes inspired by the Cohen Committee report of 1945.

Scientific progress and innovation were important rationales for the emergence of managerial authority. They implied new economic models, new competencies and wider social responsibilities. The analysis of this paper shows that these rationales have been overlooked by company law. The lack of conceptualization of the management in law allowed reforms after 1945 that gave shareholders greater influence over corporate strategy, reducing managerial discretion and the scope for innovation.

This paper focuses on the UK. Further research is needed to confirm whether other countries followed a similar path, both in terms of the emergence of management and in terms of the law’s approach.

This paper is the first, to the authors’ knowledge, to examine the law’s historical approach to management. It calls for a reappraisal of the status of managers and the way corporate governance organizes the separation of ownership and control.

Andrew Williams and I have argued since the early 1990s that not only have equity (and subsequently most other assets classes) come to be dominated by institutional ownership of various types, an observation that many have made and documented at length, but that the majority of those institutions are fiduciary ones (primarily pension and mutual funds in the United States). More recently pension and mutual funds have been the source of the majority of funds for many ‘alternative’ investments, such as hedge funds, private equity and commodity funds. In the last two decades there have been parallel developments in other countries, although the form of the institutional investors vary widely, from fiduciary ones mostly in common law countries to fiduciary-like ones in many civil law jurisdictions (e.g. the Netherlands), to some sovereign wealth funds (e.g. Norway and Australia and some others) which do not have fiduciary obligations as such, but in their legal mandates and practices are structured much like those that are fiduciary or fiduciary like. As discussed below, all these (in addition to some other large institutional owners) are universal owners, that is, they own a representative cross section of their investment universe (which increasingly is a global universe). Given their ownership structure characterised by a large degree of diversification, universal owners' long-term interests to a large degree coincide with the economy as a whole.

In the context of the risks inherent in global warming, public libraries can partner with each other, community-based environmental groups and/or other institutions to enhance community resilience and sustainability. This chapter presents a case study of an ongoing experiment to address this opportunityand challenge. In April 2021, six Western MA libraries formed a collaborative in conjunction with a local citizens’ group, Voices for Climate [V4C], to expand public education opportunities relating to understanding, mitigating, and adapting to climate change. In its initial year, this effort yielded 13 separate programs serving more than 110 patrons, all within the 7 days of Climate Preparedness Week, a state-wide program held annually. Subsequently, this Pioneer Valley Library Collaborative [PVLC] has grown to 10 library partners and continues its close alliance with V4C. In describing the programs offered in the first year, the challenges met, limitations encountered, and lessons learned, the chapter provides one model for how libraries can jointly choose to become hubs of climate conversation and education as a means to promote their communities’ quality of life, sustainability, and resilience.

Connecting and integrating the economics, organization, and management of the firm with other relevant perspectives in political science, constitutional law, and constitutional political economy, this paper revisits the nature of the corporation as a particular type of constitutional contract. The baseline argument is to show how far we can go in redesigning and democratizing the corporate form of business “societas” by using only organizational effectiveness criteria before any ethical or political options. In fact, on the basis of those (re-)foundations, the analysis addresses the questions of why the form of government of that societas should be (and in part already is in various corporate law systems) a “republic of rightholders”; who those “rightholders” should be; and which structures (organs and bodies) and decision and control procedures may sustain effective governance not only in terms of the representation of legitimate interests but also in terms of decision quality. The result is the specification of the requisite variety of “chambers” and within “chambers.”

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.

In the “shareholder primacy” (SP) view of the modern corporation, shareholders are endowed with ownership rights over the corporation. This view stems from the property rights and agency theories of the business firm formulated by financial and business economists in the 1970s and 1980s, which subsequently fed into US corporate law debates. It relies on positive legal assumptions that have largely been debunked by legal scholars, and on normative economic ideas that are equally problematic. However, SP is still very influential – if not the dominant paradigm of corporate governance, especially in the United States. The goal of the present study is to come back to the theoretical debates around the foundations of the SP paradigm to seek to identify key ideational properties that may explain, in part, the resilience of such paradigm in policy, scholarship and business practice. In particular, this paper proposes that one important reason for the persistence of the SP ideology lies in the latter’s foundation on the radically contingent nature of shareholders’ claims over the corporation.