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Retailers are increasingly adding multiple platform apps. For instance, Hilton Hotel is listed on booking.com, Expedia and TripAdvisor. The purpose of this study is to examine whether and how the adoption of a second homogenous mobile platform app by new and existing consumers affects their purchasing behavior in both the original app and the overall platform apps.

With 604,864 unique data from a Chinese fast-food company, which sequentially add three food delivery platforms, this paper explores the influence of a second homogeneous mobile platform app adoption on consumer purchase frequency, order size and spending.

The results of the log-linear regression model show that multiplatform consumers are more profitable than single-platform consumers. For both existing and new consumers, multiplatform adoption would increase purchase frequency, decrease order size and increase total spending with the retailer. However, for existing consumers, multiplatform adopters are more likely to buy less frequently, spend less per order and have lower total spending in the original platform app.

This paper contributes to platform addition and multichannel literature by empirically finding that multiplatform adopters, both new and existing consumers, are more profitable than single-platform consumers. Managerially, the results suggest that companies should not hesitate to add multiple platforms and should encourage consumers to use multiple mobile apps.

First, this study examines the multiplatform addition effect on both new and existing consumers, which has not been discussed yet. Second, this study contributes to multichannel literature by finding that multiplatform consumers are more profitable than single-platform consumers. Third, unlike Rong et al. (2021), this study supports that channel capability theory is still valid in the homogenous mobile-to-mobile channel expansion context.

The power battery is the core of a new energy vehicle and plays a vital role in the rise of the new energy vehicle industry. As the number of waste batteries increases, firms involved in the industry need to properly dispose them, but what party is responsible remains unclear. To reduce environmental impacts, governments introduce two subsidy policies, i.e. collection subsidies, which are provided to the collecting firms, and dismantling subsidies, which are provided to the dismantling firms.

Based on the different characteristics of the subsidies, we develop a stylized model to examine the collection strategies and the preferences over the subsidies.

We derive several insights from analysis. First, the collection strategies depend on the fixed collection cost. Second, the key factor determining the firm's subsidy preference is the efficiency of dismantling. Finally, if the primary target is the collection rate, governments prefer to provide collection subsidies. If consider the environmental impact, the choice of subsidies has to do with the efficiency of dismantling. Moreover, from a social welfare perspective, the raw material cost and the efficiency of dismantling are core indicators of decision.

This work develops the first analytical model to study two power battery subsidies and investigate the optimal collecting strategies and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the manufacturer and the third party but also for policymakers.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IMDS-08-2019-0450