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Institutional investors—insurance companies, pension funds, investment trust companies and unit trusts—have increased significantly and persistently their ownership of British industry. At the end of 1977 they owned approximately 46 per cent of the ordinary shares in UK quoted companies and in recent years have accounted for over 50 per cent of stock market turnover in UK equities. Their presence in the stock market has been associated with their ability to influence share prices, decide the outcome of takeover battles, and trade outside the London Stock Exchange. As major shareholders in public companies they have been encouraged to participate in managerial decision‐making. For corporate management, the growth of institutional shareholdings provides opportunities to utilise their voting power in takeover situations, encourage their support for the market value of the company, and use financial institutions as sources of new capital.

The Growth of Institutional Shareholdings 1966–1980. Institutional investors, particularly insurance companies and pension funds, are consistent purchasers of company and overseas securities. Of particular interest is the ownership of U.K. quoted equities, rather than ownership of debentures, preference shares and overseas securities. Ownership of the ordinary share capital is of particular interest because the votes attached to equities give the holders legal powers to influence management through general meetings. The impact of the growth of institutional shareholdings on corporate management and the London Stock Exchange will be discussed in later articles. This article demonstrates the growth of institutional ownership of British industry, comments on the concentration of institutional holdings in large companies, illustrates the avoidance of new issues by financial institutions, and comments on the future pattern of U.K. share ownership.

A comprehensive review of UK share ownership during the 1966–1980 period, with particular reference to the work of Revell and Moyle at the Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge.

The implications of modern portfolio theory for pension fund investment management are examined and compared with actual behaviour. It appears that the extent to which pension funds diversify goes far beyond that required for risk reduction, and therefore possible alternative motives are suggested. There is also some evidence of excessive equity trading.

Implications of Modern Portfolio Theory for Investment Management. The general principles of portfolio management are explained by Dobbins and Witt, Sprecher, Francis, Van Home and Fama and Miller. Portfolio theory is concerned with the choice of efficient combinations of assets and its foundation lies in the work of Markowitz. It is assumed that investors base their decisions simply on the expected return and variance of return of assets, where the variance is taken to measure risk. For any given level of risk, the optimal portfolio is that which offers the maximum expected return; and for any given expected return, the investor prefers minimum risk. The set of efficient portfolios therefore comprises those combinations of assets which promise the highest expected return corresponding to each level of risk.

Pension funds are rapidly acquiring voting control of UK quoted companies. Who, if anybody, should have the legal right to use the votes attached to pension fund shareholdings — pension fund managers, employees, employee representatives, members of the TUC, members of the Government, civil servants, or perhaps members of a stakeholders' council? This article sketches a few scenarios.

The corporate manager could easily be forgiven for assuming that capital budgeting is primarily concerned with the selection of an appropriate evaluation technique. Most texts on the subject are devoted almost entirely to such topics as comparisons of evaluation techniques, determining hurdle rates of return and incorporating risk into the equations. Only a few writers have suggested that this emphasis is misplaced. This article places evaluation within the whole capital investment process from the conception of an investment opportunity to its completion. It also considers the total investment programme and how it relates to organisational planning and control systems.

Firms should borrow a lot to finance their investment schedules, because interest payable on borrowings is tax deductible. However, firms should not borrow beyond the point where bankruptcy becomes a distinct possibility. When a firm's investment schedule collapses by failing to generate adequate cash to make compulsory interest payments, shareholders may be forced to suffer the costs and delays of liquidation. To ensure the survival of the firm, corporate managers should have a strategy for financial emergencies.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/eb013391. When citing the article, please cite: Richard Dobbins, (1976), “The Institutional Shareholder”, Managerial Finance, Vol. 2 Iss: 3, pp. 341 - 351.