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1 – 2 of 2Jiabing Lv, Yong Ye and Runmei Luo
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance at shareholders meetings on related party transaction (RPT) proposals.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance at shareholders meetings on related party transaction (RPT) proposals.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper empirically examines the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings on the voting results of RPT proposals based on the hand-collected voting data of Chinese listed companies.
Findings
The empirical result shows a significant positive relationship between the attendance of minority shareholders and the nonagreeable vote rate of RPT proposals. Moreover, this positive relationship is strengthened when the corporate governance is poor, the negative media coverage is high, and the on-site attendance of minority shareholders is high. Conversely, good corporate governance and high positive media coverage can weaken this positive correlation. The additional analysis reveals that the number of RPTs and better market performance in the future can be significantly reduced when minority shareholders express their nonagreeable voice actively.
Originality/value
This paper analytically and empirically examines the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings on the voting results of RPT proposals based on the hand-collected voting data of Chinese listed companies. It provides direct and convincing evidence for the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance and exercise of voting rights in shareholders’ meetings on the outcome of RPT proposals. It complements the literature on the governance effects of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings to exercise their voting rights in emerging capital markets. This study has practical value by guiding minority investors to participate actively in corporate governance.
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Runmei Luo and Yong Ye
In this study, the authors argue that the private information obtained and transmitted by institutions during the corporate visits can alleviate the degree of information…
Abstract
Purpose
In this study, the authors argue that the private information obtained and transmitted by institutions during the corporate visits can alleviate the degree of information asymmetry between firms and investors, so institutional visits may influence investors' heterogeneous beliefs. Therefore, the authors investigated whether and how institutional investors' corporate visits affect investors' heterogeneous beliefs.
Design/methodology/approach
This study examines whether and how institutional investors' corporate visits affect investors' heterogeneous beliefs using the data of A-share companies from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during 2013–2019. Using empirical research method, this study designs and conducts an empirical research according to empirical research's basic norms.
Findings
The authors find that institutional visits effectively decrease investors' heterogeneous beliefs, especially institutional investors. Meanwhile, institutional site visits and sell-side institutional visits have a more significant negative effect on investors' heterogeneous beliefs. The findings remain after robustness tests with the alternative variable, instrumental variable, propensity score matching and quantile regression methods.
Originality/value
The development of China's capital market is imperfect, resulting in a strong speculative atmosphere. So, investors' irrational investment behaviors occur from time to time, leading to sizeable heterogeneous beliefs in China's capital market, which increases the risk of investment and is not conducive to the discovery of corporate value and the efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, exploring the factors influencing heterogeneous beliefs and finding ways to alleviate heterogeneous beliefs can reduce the proportion of speculative investors and promote the healthy development of China's capital market.
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