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The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance and influence of the epistemologies: “empiricism”, “rationalism” and “positivism” in library and information science (LIS).

First, outlines the historical development of these epistemologies, by discussing and identifying basic characteristics in them and by introducing the criticism that has been raised against these views. Second, their importance for and influence in LIS have been examined.

The findings of this paper are that it is not a trivial matter to define those epistemologies and to characterise their influence. Many different interpretations exist and there is no consensus regarding current influence of positivism in LIS. Arguments are put forward that empiricism and positivism are still dominant within LIS and specific examples of the influence on positivism in LIS are provided. A specific analysis is made of the empiricist view of information seeking and it is shown that empiricism may be regarded as a normative theory of information seeking and knowledge organisation.

The paper discusses basic theoretical issues that are important for the further development of LIS as a scholarly field.

Purpose – To answer the following questions: Is all knowledge based on “experience” in Hayek's view? Was he an “empiricist” or a “Kantian”? In what sense?

Methodology/approach – Starting from a thorough analysis of Hayek's explicit ideas about empiricism and experience in The Sensory Order and some related writings, I reconstruct his epistemology but also try to improve on it with the help of some other philosophers.

Findings – Empiricism has many meanings depending on how you define “experience.” Hayek is not a “sensationalist empiricist” because he does not believe that all knowledge is based on “sense experience.” However, given his ideas of “pre-sensory experience” and “experience of the race,” Hayek is a “post-positivist empiricist.” His empiricism can be improved upon by privileging what I call “selective experience.”

Research implications – The next step is to analyze Hayek's market economics and philosophy of science to see which kind of experience guides Hayekian entrepreneurs and scientists. If this line of research is continued, practical and social implications might follow.

Originality/value of the chapter – The question whether Hayek was an “empiricist” or a “Kantian” is an old question. However, this chapter is the first systematic analysis of his “empiricist” epistemology and his concept of “experience.” Moreover, it has value beyond Hayek scholarship since, in the general empiricism debate, epistemologists have almost ubiquitously assumed that “experience” means “sense experience.”

The conflict between institutionalism and neoclassicism in the 20th century has been investigated by scholars over the years. Many of them believe that in the postwar period, neoclassicism triumphed while institutionalism largely disappeared. The present chapter takes a very different view. The late 20th century represents a broad synthesis of neoclassical and institutional themes in a methodology we call pragmatic empiricism. That approach combines the mathematical model building and theoretical formalism of neoclassical economics with the institutional economist’s data-driven statistical analysis and concern for developing institutional forms. We use as a case study the history of American locational economics from the 1930s to the present. The mixing of institutional and neoclassical themes is quite evident in the work of three young scholars at Harvard who effectively initiated American locational economics. In the postwar period, we find a series of outstanding, well-published papers that capture the spirit of the “founders.” These papers do use more modeling, but they also focus on major institutional developments. A broader review of locational works is consistent with the pragmatic empiricism label. The history of locational economics supports the claim that institutionalism, far from disappearing, continues to provide fundamental questions and techniques for modern pragmatic empiricism.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the functionality of the particular epistemological schools with regard to the issues of users with visual impairment, to offer a theoretical answer to the question why these issues are not in the center of the interest of information science, and to try to find an epistemological approach that has ambitions to create the theoretical basis for the analysis of the relationship between information and visually impaired users.

The methodological basis of the paper is determined by the selection of the epistemological approach. In order to think about the concept of information and to put it in relation to issues associated with users with visual impairment, a conceptual analysis is applied.

Most of information science theories are based on empiricism and rationalism; this is the reason for their low interest in the questions of visually impaired users. Users with visual disabilities are out of the interest of rationalistic epistemology because it underestimates sensory perception; empiricism is not interested in them paradoxically because it overestimates sensory perception. Realism which fairly reflects such issues is an approach which allows the providing of information to persons with visual disabilities to be dealt with properly.

The paper has a speculative character. Its findings should be supported by empirical research in the future.

Theoretical questions solved in the paper come from the practice of providing information to visually impaired users. Because practice has an influence on theory and vice versa, the author hopes that the findings included in the paper can serve to improve practice in the field.

The paper provides theoretical anchoring of the issues which are related to the inclusion of people with disabilities into society and its findings have a potential to support such efforts.

This is first study linking questions of users with visual disabilities to highly abstract issues connected to the concept of information.

This paper examines the ideas of David Hume and their importance to American public administration writing and practice. Hume’s ideas on empiricism, scepticism, and constitutionalism have indirectly, via their impact on modern philosophy, encouraged both support for and criticism of empiricist approaches in public administration. Also, Hume’s ideas on constitutionalism, because of their influence on the Founders' writings and design, provide an important legacy for the practice of public administration. The paper argues that Hume’s notion of mitigated scepticism, as well as his constitutional ideas, have continuing relevance for the study and practice of contemporary public administration. This paper examines the ideas of David Hume and their importance to American public administration writing and practice. Hume’s ideas on empiricism, scepticism, and constitutionalism have indirectly, via their impact on modern philosophy, encouraged both support for and criticism of empiricist approaches in public administration. Also, Hume’s ideas on constitutionalism, because of their influence on the Founders' writings and design, provide an important legacy for the practice of public administration. The paper argues that Hume’s notion of mitigated scepticism, as well as his constitutional ideas, have continuing relevance for the study and practice of contemporary public administration. This paper examines the ideas of David Hume and their importance to American public administration writing and practice. Hume’s ideas on empiricism, scepticism, and constitutionalism have indirectly, via their impact on modern philosophy, encouraged both support for and criticism of empiricist approaches in public administration. Also, Hume’s ideas on constitutionalism, because of their influence on the Founders' writings and design, provide an important legacy for the practice of public administration. The paper argues that Hume’s notion of mitigated scepticism, as well as his constitutional ideas, have continuing relevance for the study and practice of contemporary public administration. This paper examines the ideas of David Hume and their importance to American public administration writing and practice. Hume’s ideas on empiricism, scepticism, and constitutionalism have indirectly, via their impact on modern philosophy, encouraged both support for and criticism of empiricist approaches in public administration. Also, Hume’s ideas on constitutionalism, because of their influence on the Founders' writings and design, provide an important legacy for the practice of public administration. The paper argues that Hume’s notion of mitigated scepticism, as well as his constitutional ideas, have continuing relevance for the study and practice of contemporary public administration.

A recent article in this journal by John Smith and Joseph Blase criticized empiricism as a theoretical base for theories of educational leadership, suggested hermeneutics as a replacement host theory and then, in its terms, advanced some views on leadership. Without rejecting their thoughts concerning proper leadership, argues that much of what they say is consistent not just with hermeneutics but with versions of empiricism less “straw‐mannish” than the view they reject. Identifies difficulties in the hermeneutical theories advanced by Smith and Blase and advances an alternative philosophical framework for educational leadership theory.

The purpose of this paper is to establish the case that innovation in the theory and practice of educational administration/leadership is very unlikely to occur within the existing doxa of our times. By innovation is meant a novel conceptual or practical change in the field of practice. By doxa is meant the unquestioned rules of the game and the linkage between the agencies and organs of government and foundations supporting research in the field. An approach toward thinking outside of the prevailing doxa is presented and explained as one possible antidote to the current dominant model.

The paper is a conceptual/logical analysis of the reasons why the current paradigm dominant in the study and the practice of educational administration/leadership is inadequate. The paradigm has not predicted anything currently unknown or understood yet its continued dominance in the field will not lead to any new discoveries or innovation but only continued verification of what is already known.

The major findings are that the boundaries of behavioral empiricism and social science methods impose an orthodoxy of approach in examining matters of administrative and leadership practice. Subsequently, it not only limits but also prohibits any new breakthroughs in understanding or predicting novel thinking about administration and leadership in educational institutions. Breaking out of this conceptual and theoretical box will be difficult as it is embraced by an interlocking apparatus of agencies and institutions and enshrined in most research journals in the field.

It is unlikely that true new discoveries in understanding educational leadership will occur without a restoration of the full range of human emotions and motivations which inspire and sustain leaders. New visions of leadership are required which will lead to what Lakatos has called a progressive research program in which prediction is enhanced and novel aspects of leadership emerge. These are not likely to occur given the tradition of inquiry currently in use. To use Lakatos’ term, the current research program is de-generative or regressive and lags behind the actual practice of school leadership. Thus, the authors perpetuate the theory-practice gap.

The continued employment of social science protocols anchored in behavioral empiricism and the scientific method are unlikely to lead to any new breakthroughs in the practice of educational administration/leadership. The lens of behavioral empiricism prohibits a complete understanding of the practice of leadership where that practice becomes “subjective” and/or essentially artistic in nature. Practice, therefore, is anchored only in what is considered “rational” and the non-rational aspects marginalized or eliminated.

Researchers working in the dominant social science perspectives using hard behavioral empirical traditions embodied in the usual perspective regarding the scientific method will continue to miss or marginalize the emotional and intuitive side of leadership, aspects which are hard to quantify and assess. Leaders not only act but they feel as well. Without emotion in leadership it is extremely hard to build trust in an organization. The moral responsibilities of leaders are also anchored in emotion and values held by the leader. These elements continue to be understated or marginalized in check list approaches to preparation and licensure.

The originality of the paper synthesizes the parallel perspectives of William Foster, Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Imre Lakatos as it pertains to explaining why the current theory of knowledge is not likely to lead to any new breakthroughs in the practice of educational administration/leadership. One different approach to thinking of leadership as connoisseurship is presented as a potential perspective from the arts as a way of viewing leadership as a form of performance in which emotion and intuition are recognized aspects of practice.

With the demise of the empiricist theory of knowledge and the increased prominence of postempiricist and hermeneutical perspectives, it is clear that various aspects of our social lives – including educational leadership – should no longer be thought of in terms of technological or instrumental rationality and technical expertise. Although the current philosophical ferment allows for different ways to rethink leadership, this article examines the implications of one school of thought – philosophical hermeneutics – for the research on, and especially the practice of, educational leadership. The central point is that this perspective, when interpreted in terms of how we think of ourselves as persons, results in a conceptualisation of leadership as a predominantly practical and moral activity.

In this chapter, we present a critical assessment of contemporary organization theory variously described as either multiperspectival or fragmented. We argue that analytic philosophy as one of the major tools used for theorizing about organizations has had a major influence on the development of organization theory and largely explains the current state of affairs. At its core, we argue, is a fundamental methodological fissure in analytic philosophy itself: the distinction between descriptive and revisionary methods. The principal focus of descriptive analysis in organization theory is how agents use everyday language in organizational contexts, often by invoking language games. In contrast, revisionary approaches, concerned about the privileging of theories embedded in everyday language, as well as the complexity and ambiguity of ordinary-language use, aim for explicit theory evaluation and greater clarity by recasting ordinary language in formal systems, such as scientific, especially empiricist, theories, characteristic of the mainstream of theorizing about organizations from the 1940s onward. For a number of theoretical and epistemological reasons logical empiricism or positivism is no longer a widely held view either in the philosophy of science or in the organization theory. We examine some critical issues regarding logical empiricist epistemological foundations and propose a methodological naturalistic framework that supports the ongoing growth of knowledge in organization theory, naturalistic coherentism. In developing this new conception of science we thus opt for a revisionary methodology, but one that is beholden to neither the traditional logical empiricist/positivist conception of (organization) science nor the relativism and conservatism of postmodernist theory, widely considered to be the successor of positivist organization theory.