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The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and institutional and financial development on corporate risk of Latin-American firms.

The GMM estimator was used according to Arellano and Bond (1991) for panel data on a sample of 914 non-financial companies between 2005 and 2017.

AEM practices significantly increase corporate risk. This result indicates that the risk increase is associated to weakening of the corporate governance of companies. Positive discretionary accruals also have the same impact on corporate risk. In addition, accrual-based earnings management has a non-linear impact on corporate risk. Higher institutional and financial development systemically reduces the risk of Latin American firms. Institutional development can mitigate the effects of earnings management on corporate risk.

These results support that AEM represents a practice that managers use to weaken firms' corporate governance and expropriate wealth from shareholders. These practices promote higher firm's risk. However, the institutional and financial development reduces the corporate risk and contributes to mitigate the impact of AEM on it. These results have relevant implications for firms' corporate governance because they warn the relevance to control AEM practices and its impact over corporate risk perception by investors. These results also are relevant to policymakers because they orient the financial policies design to strengthen the institutional and financial development as a systematic way to reduce the firm's risk.

El propósito de este artículo es analizar los efectos de la gestión de ganancias basada en devengos (AEM) y el desarrollo institucional y financiero sobre el riesgo corporativo de las empresas latinoamericanas.

Se utilizó el estimador GMM de Arellano y Bond (1991) sobre una muestra de 914 empresas no financieras entre 2005 y 2017.

Las prácticas de AEM aumentan significativamente el riesgo corporativo. Este resultado indica que el aumento del riesgo está asociado al debilitamiento del gobierno corporativo de las empresas. Los devengos discrecionales positivos también tienen el mismo impacto en el riesgo corporativo. Además, la gestión de ganancias basada en el devengo tiene un impacto no lineal sobre el riesgo. Un mayor desarrollo institucional y financiero reduce sistémicamente el riesgo de las empresas. El desarrollo institucional puede mitigar los efectos de la gestión de ganancias sobre el riesgo corporativo.

Estos resultados revelan que AEM es una práctica que debilita los gobiernos corporativos y permite expropiar riqueza de los accionistas. Estas prácticas promueven un mayor riesgo corporativo, aunque el desarrollo institucional y financiero lo reduce. Estos resultados tienen implicancias relevantes para el gobierno corporativo de las empresas porque indican la relevancia de controlar estas prácticas en la percepción de riesgo de los inversionistas. Estos resultados también son relevantes para los reguladores porque orientan el diseño de políticas financieras hacia el fortalecimiento del desarrollo institucional y financiero como una vía sistemática que reduce el riesgo de las empresas.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how venture capital (VC) backing influences the board size and independence and how VC backing and board structure impact firm performance in China.

Using hand-collected data from 924 initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses covering the period from January 2004 to December 2012, the authors investigate the impact of VC backing on board size, board independence and firm market performance through regression analysis. A two-stage approach is also used to address the endogeneity issue.

The authors find robust evidence that VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards, after controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, and the potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, firms backed by VCs with management political ties (PTs) have more independent directors with industry relevant expertise than other firms. While no significant relationship is found between board independence and firm performance, the authors present some evidence that IPOs which have a larger percentage of independent directors with industry relevant expertise exhibit higher long-term stock returns, and VCs with management PTs also improve IPO long-run stock performance.

Although VC is new in China and the Chinese capital market has relative poor corporate governance and weak minority shareholder protection, the authors find support in this paper that VC backing is valuable to IPO firms in China not only through providing funding but also by providing political ties and industry experience. However, Chinese regulatory and institutional settings have strong impact on test results and they change rapidly, so the results may not apply to other period in Chinese markets.

This paper sheds lights on the influences of VC backing on corporate governance and firm performance in a transitional and emerging economy. It discovers the value of VC investors in a transitional economy as of providing political ties and industry experience. The new definition of independent directors suggested by Suchard (2009) is first used by our paper in the Chinese context.

The objective of this paper is to determine the effects of the European debt crisis on the European government bonds.

In this paper, we present the European government bond; we explain the European debt crisis; and we examine the evolution of the European debt.

Our results suggest that the increase of the European debt contributed to the increase of the risk and the default of the European debt and to the depreciation of the economies of the European countries.

We calculate the value of the European debt risks in normal cases and in the case of crisis with normal distribution.

Since the implementation of the regulatory inquiry system, research on its impact on information disclosure in the capital market has been increasing. This article focuses on a specific area of study using Chinese annual report inquiry letters as the basis. From a text mining perspective, we explore whether the textual information contained in these inquiry letters can help predict financial restatement behavior of the inquired companies.

Python was used to process the data, nonparametric tests were conducted for hypothesis testing and indicator selection, and six machine learning models were employed to predict financial restatements.

Some text feature indicators in the models that exhibit significant differences are useful for predicting financial restatements, particularly the proportion of formal positive words and stopwords, readability, total word count and certain textual topics. Securities regulatory authorities are increasingly focusing on the accounting and financial aspects of companies' annual reports.

This study explores the textual information in annual report inquiry letters, which can provide insights for other scholars into research methods and content. Besides, it can assist with decision making for participants in the capital market.

We use information technology to study the textual information in annual report inquiry letters and apply it to forecast financial restatements, which enriches the research in the field of regulatory inquiries.

In the context of sustainable development goal 5 of the United Nations 2030 Agenda: “Achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment”, where gender equality is not only a matter of justice but also essential to achieve sustainable development, this paper aims to examine the gender pay gap in executive director compensation and the influence of female board representation and participation in nomination and remuneration committee (NRC) on this gap in Spanish listed firms over the period 2012–2022.

The analysis is conducted using a data set created by the authors, which includes executive director compensation data for 164 unique firms. This data set comprises 128 distinct observations for a given firm and year for women, and 2,333 observations for men. The authors estimate ordinary least squares models, clustering standard errors by executive. The authors use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to decompose gender differences in compensation into differences in the characteristics of men and women and differences in the return on the same characteristics.

The authors find evidence of pay penalty for female executive directors compared to male counterparts. After controlling for firm, board and executive characteristics, the authors find that women earn 27% less than comparable men. The penalty is lower in companies with a higher share of women on the compensation committee, suggesting that women’s participation plays a role in setting a more equal remuneration policy. The gender gap in executive compensation narrows over time due to a substantial reduction of the differences between men and women in both characteristics and the return on these characteristics.

This study is one of the few analysing the gender gap in executive director compensation and its evolution in Spain. It specifically explores how gender diversity on both the board and the NRC impacts this gap. The analysis is focused on the most recent period characterized by important efforts to promote gender diversity.

This paper investigates the relationship between risk management practices and potential fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia by considering recent regulatory reforms of the Malaysian government on risk management practices.

The sample of this study was based on 257 firm-year observations during the 2012–2017 period. This study employed panel-least square regressions with period fixed effects.

This study found a significant association between risk management activities in the disclosure and potential fraudulent financial reporting. Nevertheless, this study found there is insignificant effect of the risk-management committee in reducing potential of fraudulent financial reporting.

This study is a pioneer research that relates firms’ risk management practices with potential fraudulent financial reporting measured by F-score. Thus, this study provides an insight to regulators on the extent of risk-management practices in deterring potential fraudulent financial reporting which can be used as an input for greater enforcement of risk-management regulations.

Business corporations (and unincorporated joint-stock companies) formed in Britain and the United States in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century were lightly regulated by today’s standards and, as startups, sold equity directly to investors without the aid of intermediaries, yet they suffered relatively few governance breakdowns. That is because republican government-style checks against the arbitrary power of any group of stakeholders (managers, blockholders, directors) suffused their founding documents (charters/constitutions, articles of agreement, bylaws), raising the expected costs of defalcation above the expected benefits. Over the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the original checks disintegrated. They were functionally replaced twice, first by financial capitalism a la J. P. Morgan, then by corporate raiders and takeover specialists like KKR, but politicians neutralized the first and managers (and judges) the second, leaving many widely held corporations today under the control of CEOs/Board Chairmen who can self-deal with near impunity and have apparent incentives to do so. A return to the precepts of the republican model could help to improve governance outcomes in the future.

Risk reporting in financial reports has a positive impact on the company and its stakeholders. The purpose of this research is to present a literature review using the bibliometric method with the title we used is Risk Reporting, and the keywords are risk disclosure, risk reporting, stakeholders, and stakeholder theory. Data processing in this chapter uses Publish or Perish (PoP) software and Vos Viewers. This study uses the Google Scholar database. The researcher scanned the journal by using Scimagojr.com to view the journal quartile. Before the search was revised, there were 230 papers from 1991 to 2021 (30 years). Researchers will see the development of risk reporting from several sides, such as the country of origin of the researcher, the type of industry that reports risk, the research methods that have been used so far, and the analysis used for reporting risk.

This study aims to verify the influence of stakeholders on Disruptive Innovation Disclosure (DID) by using company size as a control variable. DID is measured using the DID index. The authors use panel data regression with the period 2011–2020. Observations were made on 198 companies throughout the year in companies around the world. This study proves that shareholders, customers, suppliers, and company size are dimensions that affect DID. This situation shows that these dimensions have the power to control DID. The average company in the world has provided information about disruptive innovation. The scope of this research is limited to countries that have a visualization network of disruptive innovation collaboration in as many as 15 countries. The value of this study is to portray DID in countries that have disruptive innovation collaborative visualization networks.

The first alternative is to enrich shareholding by management. The basic theory of this research is the agency theory. This study aims to examine the institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk that are interconnected directly or indirectly. The research sample was a non-financial company from 2010 to 2014. Four variables will be tested using Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) in the SPSS application. The result of this study represents the overall interdependency relationship among institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk. The research outcome signifies an interdependency relation for endogenous variables, even if some exogenous variables have no significant relation. In addition, the effects of substitution between institutional ownership and dividend policy, debt policy and dividend policy, and institutional ownership and risk. Meanwhile, institutional ownership and dividend policy, risk and dividend policy, and risk and debt policy have no substitution effect.