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This paper aims to use a risk management approach for re-profiling of sovereign debt. It develops profiles that trade off expected cost of financing alternative debt structures against their risk. The risk profiles are particularly informative for countries facing sovereign debt crisis, as they allow us to identify, with high probability, debt unsustainability. Risk profiles for two eurozone countries with excessive debt, Cyprus and Italy, were developed. In addition, risk profiles were developed for a proposal to impose debt sanctions in the Ukrainian crisis and it was shown that the financial impact could be substantial.

Using scenario analysis, a risk measure of the sovereign’s debt – Conditional Debt-at-Risk – was developed, and an optimization model was then used to trade off expected cost of debt financing against the Conditional Debt-at-Risk. The model is applied to three diverse settings from current crises.

The methodology traces informative risk profiles to identify sustainable debt structures. Interesting, although tentative, conclusions are drawn for the countries where the methodology was applied. Cyprus’s debt sustainability hinges on current International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections about gross domestic product growth and small deviations can push debt into unsustainable territory. For Italy, our analysis provides evidence of debt unsustainability. Common assumption of debt by eurozone member states could restore sustainability for Italy. Finally, it is shown how a proposal to impose debt sanctions against Russia for the Ukrainian crisis could have significant financial impact for Ukraine.

Additional work is needed to calibrate the simulation models for each country separately. Nevertheless, the direction of the results is such that more careful calibration will most likely not alter the conclusions but make them stronger instead.

The results provide significant insights for the management of sovereign debt for Cyprus and Italy. They also show the significant positive impact on Ukrainian public finances from debt sanctions. However, the most important practical implication is to show how the proposed methodology provided a decision support tool for restructuring and rescheduling sovereign debt for crisis countries.

There is widespread acceptance that debt restructuring has been too little and too late in recent crises failing to re-establish market access in a durable way. How to develop risk profiles for alternative debt structures has been illustrated. Debt profiles that are unsustainable can be identified, with high probability, and alternative structures proposed that restore sustainability. The methodology proposed in this paper is providing a useful tool of analysis. The topic of debt relief is currently debated widely at policy circles by the IMF and the United Nations, and the analysis of this paper provides some insightful input to the debate.

The use of scenario analysis for sovereign debt modeling and the use of an optimization model developed by the authors in previous research provide empirical analysis for three current problems in sovereign debt management. Useful insights are obtained for three important real-world cases for Cyprus, Italy and Ukraine.

The paper examines the impact of the deteriorating fiscal conditions of Eurozone countries on spillover effects on bank credit margins. It is investigated whether these effects have been reduced after European Central Bank’s (ECB) signaling of pursuing an expansionary, unconventional, monetary policy to address the debt crisis in Eurozone.

A general econometric panel model is applied to investigate spillover effects between Eurozone countries and bank credit margins. In total, three periods are examined: the period before the peak of the global financial crisis and the beginning of the Irish banking crisis, the period during the debt and bank crisis in Eurozone and the period after ECB's signaling of extremely aggressive monetary easing.

According to empirical results, before the peak of the global financial crisis there was no substantial credit risk transfer from Eurozone sovereigns to banks. During the period of debt and bank crisis in Eurozone, the deterioration of the fiscal situation of Eurozone countries had a significant impact on bank Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. After ECB's signaling of extremely aggressive monetary easing, it does not seem to be any significant relationship between Eurozone sovereigns and bank CDS spreads. These findings reinforce the assessment that ECB's measures were effective, achieving the key objective of normalizing economic conditions and ensuring financial stability in Eurozone.

A question is whether effects can change when the corresponding contraction will lead to a reinstatement of “normal” conditions. Would there be a reversal of risk premium trends in bond markets? Although the answer from casual observations seems to be negative, it is a valid research question to be examined. An interesting issue concerning the unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by ECB concerns the issues of moral hazard that they incorporate, something that could not be addressed. Another research perspective could be the use of the beta coefficient to measure the systematic and unsystematic risk of banking sector shares.

The results have strong implications for ECB and European banking regulation. Regulators should mainly pay more attention to the amount and concentration of sovereign debt held by banks. Eurozone financial system could be less vulnerable to the sovereign credit risk. It raised the critical question of whether a more strict regulation is needed. Regulators should not intervene if not necessary, but they must prevent the transmission of crises between markets. This will likely bring trust to the developed countries' sovereign debt and the portfolios of the financial institutions, which hold most of this debt will be considered safe as well.

The conclusions provide a safe counterweight in various respects. First, the negative effects and the need to rapidly cease or limit such policies. Second, the financial stability aimed by ECB. Such policies contain the possibility of a subsequent moral hazard related to Member State and bank behavior. However, these contingencies need to be assessed with the benefits resulting from the restoration of financial markets and the disconnection between banking and sovereign credit risk. This leads Eurozone's financial system to become less vulnerable to the sovereign credit risk and therefore more safe, helping to restore confidence in the real economy.

Contribution in terms of methodology and conclusions. It offers important conclusions regarding the limitations of yields and volatility of CDS spreads. It examines the spillover effects of the fiscal situation of Eurozone countries on banking institutions by extending the existing methodology and introducing new questions focusing on the reaction of CDS market to the ECB monetary policy, the reduction of risk premiums at sovereign and banking level and the gradual reduction of interdependence between them.

The Eurozone debt crisis has indeed jeopardized the recovery plans put in place post global crisis by regulators, policymakers, and the sovereigns. Though the crisis is epicentered in the Eurozone, the knock-on effects of the crisis are felt all across the globe. The emerging and developing economies (EDEs) are also expected to post lower growth on account of worsening external environment and a weakening internal demand. This chapter analyzes the causes for sovereign debt crisis, presents the implications of sovereign debt crises, and draws lessons for banking sectors more particularly in the context of emerging markets like that of India.

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that major credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been inconsistent in assessing the implications of monetary union membership for sovereign risks. It is frequently argued that CRAs have acted procyclically in their rating of sovereign debt in the European Monetary Union (EMU), underestimating sovereign risk in the early years and over-rating the lack of national monetary sovereignty since the onset of the Eurozone debt crisis. Yet, there is little direct evidence for this so far. While CRAs are quite explicit about their risk assessments concerning public debt that is denominated in foreign currency, the same cannot be said about their treatment of sovereign debt issued in the currency of a monetary union.

While CRAs are quite explicit about their risk assessments concerning public debt that is denominated in foreign currency, the same cannot be said about their treatment of sovereign debt issued in the currency of a monetary union. This paper examines the major CRAs’ methodologies for rating sovereign debt and test their sovereign credit ratings for a monetary union bonus in good times and a malus, akin to the “original sin” problem of emerging market countries, in bad times.

Using a newly compiled dataset of quarterly sovereign bond ratings from 1990 until 2012, the panel regression estimation results find strong evidence that EMU countries received a rating bonus on euro-denominated debt before the European debt crisis and a large penalty after 2010.

The crisis has brought to light that EMU countries’ euro-denominated debt may not be considered as local currency debt from a rating perspective after all.

In addition to quantifying the local currency bonus and malus, this paper shows the fundamental problem of rating sovereign debt of monetary union members and provide approaches to estimating it over time.

In the domestic credit market creditor and debtor rights are clearly defined. In contrast, sovereign debt repayment is largely contingent on the debtor government’s willingness to repay as enforcement of contracts at the international level is limited. In this chapter we explore different sources of sovereign debt crises as opportunistic and myopic behavior by debtor nations, over-consumption of imported goods, credit temptation by lenders eager to allocate savings surpluses, and unexpected consequences of initially seen appropriate policies. We explore how these factors have played out in the Euro-debt crisis and outline a framework for creditor responsibility to complement debtor self-restraint.

The Covid-19 pandemic has rekindled interest in sovereign debt crises amidst calls for debt relief for developing and emerging countries. But has debt relief lessened the debt burdens of emerging and developing economies? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. In particular, the focus is on the implications of debt relief and institutional qualities for sovereign debt in emerging and developing economies.

The model extends the framework on the probability of default by incorporating the receipt of debt relief by a debtor country. Doing so allows to better explain movements of sovereign defaults relating to debt relief. The model is estimated via the regular probit regression.

The analysis shows that the debt relief provided, thus, far, failed to ease the debt overhang problems of developing and emerging countries and reduced investment. The current debt relief schemes may underscore the prospects of self-enforcing and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises rather than eliminating the dilemma completely. Regarding the forms of debt relief, the analysis shows that debt forgiveness offers favourable prospects in terms of debt sustainability and economic outcomes than debt rescheduling. Perhaps, the sovereign debt crises, particularly in low-income countries, hinge on insolvency problems rather than transitory illiquidity issues.

Any debt relief mechanism should consider seriously the potential incentive effect that reinforces expectations of future debt-relief initiatives. Importantly, solving the sovereign debt problem requires a programme for sustained investment and economic growth, while not discounting the critical role of prudent debt management policies and institutions.

This study contributes a different angle to the debate on sovereign debt distress. Aside from the structural and economic factors, this study investigates the role of debt management policy in the debtor nation and the implications of debt relief benefits for sovereign risk. The framework also focuses on whether the different forms of debt relief exert distinctive impacts.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and then analyze the interdependency between bank and sovereign risk before, during and after the financial crisis.

The authors' approach is based upon an examination of 44 large banks headquartered in 13 countries; eight of these countries belong to the European Union, seven belong to the eurozone, and the remaining five belong to neither group. This provides a good comparison group of countries.

Evidence is found supporting the existence of significant bank and sovereign risk linkages. There are, however, different patterns in the relationships across countries and even across banks within the same country. Also, higher correlations between bank and sovereign risk are found in countries in which the ratio of the assets of banks relative to their home country's GDP is relatively high.

Based upon the empirical results, allowing banks to invest in sovereign debt without requiring them to hold any capital against the “true” risk of such debt increases the likelihood of insolvency. This means that interdependencies between bank and sovereign risk are extremely important when setting regulatory capital requirements and considering whether action is needed to limit any increase in the likelihood of contagion.

The paper provides a new examination of the interdependencies between individual bank risk and the sovereign risk of the countries in which they are headquartered, with special emphasis on the recent global financial and eurozone crises.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.