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The literature on post-completion reviews (PCRs) either does not deal with the tying of PCRs to extrinsic rewards or provides scant theoretical reasoning or empirical analysis to back up its recommendations.

Based on research from psychology and empirical studies, the present chapter proposes that several effects of a PCR, which must be deemed rather dysfunctional, will increase when extrinsic rewards are linked to such a review. At the same time some possibly functional effects, however, are likely to remain constant. The propositions, therefore, call the usefulness of tying PCRs to rewards into question and call for further investigation.

With the rapid development of the digital economy, an increasing number of digitalized two-sided platforms have deployed the tying strategy to leverage their market power from the core two-sided product to other two-sided products in the competitive market, which transforms the competition among single platforms into that among platform ecological networks. To clarify the mechanism of the formation of the digital platform ecological networks, this paper aims to analyze the expansion and stability of platform ecology by exploring the impacts of network externalities and sellers’ heterogeneity on the tying strategy of two-sided platforms.

This paper develops a game model of two-sided platforms based on Choi and Jeon (2021), which highlights the decisive influence of non-negative price constraints (NPC) on platforms’ tying motivation. Taking the operating systems market as an example, we expand from the perspective of platform service differences to relax the NPC and explore the internal logic of platform ecosystem expansion.

Platforms have an incentive to charge lower prices or even subsidize buyers when the network externalities on the sellers’ side are relatively strong. When the product is highly differentiated and heterogenous, platforms are motivated to tie to capture more buyers with a lower price and grab excess profits from sellers. Eventually, tying is able to consolidate the two-sided platform ecological networks by excluding competitors, capturing user value and deterring entry.

In order to describe the characteristics of platform ecological network more generally, this paper extends the research based on the analyses of Choi and Jeon (2021) by (1) allowing horizontal differences between tied products and (2) relaxing the NPC. Unlike Choi and Jeon (2021), this paper allows platforms to charge users of two-sided platforms at negative prices (or to subsidize them). (3) Setting simultaneous pricing in two-sided platforms. Classical two-sided market theory stresses that the presence of cross-network externalities can give rise to a “chicken and egg” problem.

This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case, such as dynamic monopoly power, static monopoly power and market power.

The chapter presents simple economic models to analyse which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

The prerequisite market power is simply market power in the predatory pricing case or static monopoly power in the tying case.

Dynamic monopoly power defined as the market power from an antitrust perspective by the Antitrust Modernization Commission should not be the prerequisite market power in the case of the abuse of dominance or the violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

A possession of substantial market power or monopoly power is typically understood as a prerequisite in abuse of dominance in Korea and EU or violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States. However, the antitrust law does not clearly indicate the meaning of market power or monopoly power. This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case and analyses which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

To understand the new non-linear pricing in E-commerce. The present paper aims to put forth an idea of using tie-in agreement in the electronic commerce market in the name of trust in India. According to the Indian antitrust law, tie-in agreement is not allowed to use as compulsory in an offer to the buyer. This means that a tie-in agreement cannot be a compulsion or only an option to the buyer. This means it can be an extra option.

The paper shows that using this logic the sellers are giving two options simultaneously to the buyer: (1) a commodity with a tie-in agreement and (2) the same commodity without a tie-in agreement. Therefore, there are two price mechanisms that are present. Now it is the decision of the buyer to choose between the two. These two price mechanisms create a new variable called trust. If the buyer selects the first option, then that buyer will not be treated as a trustworthy buyer, but in the second case, the buyer would be treated as a trustworthy or the affianced buyer. Therefore, the buyer would be leaning toward the second option. The paper proves that in the second option it would be difficult to minimize the consumer expenditure. As a result, there would be a situation of non-linear pricing in the name of trust which is hidden in the offer. The present work gives both theoretical models and empirical justifications.

We find that E-wallet is often used when a consumer orders food online but offline cash payment is preferred. Therefore, the offer does matter for the consumer. Hence, the offer can be used to make a tie-in arrangement. Therefore, even if there is a tie-in arrangement in online food servicing applications, the Competition Commission of India can restrict such practices as for illegal tying, the firm has to have the monopoly power in one market and there should be compulsory tie-arrangement in another market. But it does not mean that E-wallet tie-arrangement cannot be ignored as the monopoly power in the online food servicing market can influence the market share in the E-wallet market. Tie-in arrangement is also important, as the consumer has to spend more under cashback offer conditions which reduce the long-run gain of consumers.

The paper considered trust as a new element in forming non-linear pricing. This is new to this literature.

This paper focuses on two related questions at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law. First, under what circumstances must the holder of a patent or a copyright or the owner of a trade secret allow others to use that intellectual property? Second, under what circumstances can the holder of an intellectual property right use that right to make it difficult for another party to succeed in a related market? These questions have vexed antitrust and intellectual property scholars alike ever since the Federal Circuit ruled in 2000 that patent holders “may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws,” a ruling that directly contradicted the Ninth Circuit ruling that antitrust liability could be imposed for almost identical conduct, depending on the motivations of the patent holder. The various proceedings in United States v. Microsoft only added fuel to the firestorm of controversy.After briefly retracing the jurisprudential path to see how this situation arose, we propose a solution that primarily involves a variation on the real property concept of adverse possession for the intellectual property space along with a slight extension of the Essential Facilities Doctrine for industries that exhibit network effects. We examine, both for firms with and without market power, how our proposal would resolve the situations presented by large fixed asset purchases, the introduction of entirely new products, and operating systems with network effects. We also demonstrate how our proposal could be applied in the European antitrust enforcement context.

Recognizing construction workers' activities is critical for on-site performance and safety management. Thus, this study presents the potential of automatically recognizing construction workers' actions from activations of the erector spinae muscles.

A lab study was conducted wherein the participants (n = 10) performed rebar task, which involved placing and tying subtasks, with and without a wearable robot (exoskeleton). Trunk muscle activations for both conditions were trained with nine well-established supervised machine learning algorithms. Hold-out validation was carried out, and the performance of the models was evaluated using accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score.

Results indicate that classification models performed well for both experimental conditions with support vector machine, achieving the highest accuracy of 83.8% for the “exoskeleton” condition and 74.1% for the “without exoskeleton” condition.

The study paves the way for the development of smart wearable robotic technology which can augment itself based on the tasks performed by the construction workers.

This study contributes to the research on construction workers' action recognition using trunk muscle activity. Most of the human actions are largely performed with hands, and the advancements in ergonomic research have provided evidence for relationship between trunk muscles and the movements of hands. This relationship has not been explored for action recognition of construction workers, which is a gap in literature that this study attempts to address.

Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this chapter I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.

In this paper we examine the impact of tied aid on capital accumulation and welfare in the presence of a quota on imports. Using a simulation model we establish that tied aid can lower the relative domestic price of the manufactured good and therefore reduce the stock of capital. In the presence of a strong production externality from capital accumulation and high tying ratio, tied aid may immiserize the recipient country.

Examines franchising as a relatively recent concept of mass marketing. Looks at the ways in which it supports its claim of providing effective control for the customer. Investigates petrol station franchising in order to justify this claim, looking in particular at the solus system of market expansion. Concludes that franchising is an effective tool for the customer with the franchisee providing a “proven formula” for success.